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Abstract 
When firms announce a restatement of their financial reports, they inform 
investors that their prior announcements were faulty. Not only do companies lose 
credibility at times such as this but also their securities are revalued as investors 
respond to the substance of the announcement. We investigate investor size to 
understand how large and small investors differ in their responses to restatement 
announcements. Our results indicate that large investors seemingly anticipate the 
announcement; their holdings decrease before restatement announcements; 
consequently large investors trading after announcements is less pronounced than 
for smaller investors. The response of small investors depends on who has 
prompted the restatement: the company itself, FASB or the SEC and not on the 
reason for the restatement such as problems with revenue recognition, 
restructuring or cost/expense. Large investor trading volume is affected by both 
the source of the restatement and the reason for it. Large investors seem to 
anticipate potential problems, and sell securities before restatement 
announcements. 
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1. Introduction 
Few researchers have questioned how different types of investors react to 
the announcement of accounting restatements. This study seeks answers to 
several related questions about the reaction of different investors to 
restatements. Specifically, we consider whether the response of large and small 
investors is different either before and/or after the announcement of a 
restatement and whether their responses are affected by the reason for the 
restatement or who has prompted the restatements. 
Despite the heavy reliance investors place on accounting financial statements 
they are not flawless1. When errors are discovered, restatements are issued that 
reveal the consequences of the mistakes with the updated accurate information. 
However, accounting restatements signal that prior statements are not credible. 
Accounting restatements are increasingly more common in financial reporting as a 
result investors respond negatively to restatement news Anderson and Yohn 
(2002). Palmrose et al. (2004) (PRS) document a mean (median) negative market 
reaction of -9.2 % (-4.6%) over a two-day event window to a restatement 
announcement using market adjusted abnormal returns. PRS also found negative 
equity returns to be larger when restatements a) involve fraud, b) financial 
accounts, c) affect reported income and d) are attributed to auditors and 
management. 
Ohlson (1975) and Wilson (1975) theoretical works showed that wealthier 
investors get more benefit from information emanated from firms. Moreover, 
wealthier and more informed investors are likely to make larger trades at the time 
of the earnings announcements (Cready, 1988; Lee (1988); Lee and Radhakrishna 
(2000)). Prior research also showed that transaction size increases with 
informedness of investors (Easley and O’Hara (1987); Hasbrouck (1998)). 
Following above arguments, large traders may have the capability and discipline 
to investigate the detail structure of a restatement announcement and formulate 
a reasoned trading strategy. Small traders are unlikely to have the ability or 
resources to interpret restatements to the same depth as large traders; therefore, 
small traders are likely to respond differently to restatements than large traders. 
                                                          
1 Investors use a firm’s financial information to estimate value (see, Ball and Brown (1968) 
and Beaver (1968)). Financial information also reduces information asymmetry between 
executives and stock holders (see, Lee et al. (1993)). Valuations are only as good as the 
information presented in financial statements. This statement has led to various research 
threads including Lang and Lundholm (1993) who studied analyst perception of disclosure 
quality, Defond and Park (2001) who examined earnings persistence, and Jones (1991) 
who looked at the quality of accounting information. 
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Alternatively, large investors are more likely to trade speculatively and adjust 
their holdings on the day of the earnings or restatement announcements Demski 
and Feltham (1994). 
As we stated above accounting restatements signal that prior statements are 
flawed. That discovery decreases investors’ confidence in restating firms and their 
managements, and may lead investors to change their future investment plans. 
General Accounting Office (2002) observes accounting restatements decreasing 
investor wealth because of falling equity values. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) note that 
institutional investors may shift portfolios away from businesses that restate. 
Hribar et al (2005) (HJJ) studied the relationship between investor type (i.e., 
transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexing institutions) and restatements. They 
found higher portfolio turnover among transient institutional investors, i.e., those 
with shorter investment horizons, prior to a quarterly restatement. Neither 
dedicated nor quasi-indexing institutions made similar prerestatement portfolio 
changes. HJJ utilized the 13F filing database2, the  database does not detail 
portfolio changes by both small and large investors. Nor did HJJ investigate the 
effect on trading behavior of a) who prompted the restatement or b) the 
restatements’ reasons what we are investigating. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by classifying investors as small and 
large traders according to their daily trade size around accounting restatement 
announcement date to determine their trading behavior and what specific 
information they trade on. Specifically, we examine small and large trader’s ex-
ante and ex-post trading behavior and how this behavior is affected by who 
prompted the restatement and the reason for the restatement3. We use event 
study methodology to reduce the impact of other events occurring around the 
restatement announcement date which differentiate our study from HJ study. Like 
PRS (2004) we find that financial reporting restatements influence stock prices. 
We also find that type of restatement, who is the prompter and the reason for the 
restatement, differentially affect share price as does investor size. 
We conjecture that these differential trading behaviors of small and large 
investors result from the way that they interpret public announcements 
differently in a fashion similar to Kim and Verrecchia (1991) framework where 
investors’ information set and sophistication play significant role on their usage. 
We find that the trading pattern of large investors seems to anticipate 
                                                          
2 Firms are required to detail quarterly the ownership positions of major shareholders in 
the form of 13F filings to the SEC. 
3 Restatements of financials have different characteristics related to who prompted the 
restatement and the reasons for the restatement. 
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restatements; they sell before the announcement and then repurchase the stock 
at a discount after the restatement. Small investors exhibit less prerestatement 
foresight than large investors. We also observe a relationship between the 
structure of restatement announcements (initiator and reasons) and the degree 
of traders’ responses as measured by abnormal trading volume. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the 
research design then presents research issues, Section 3 defines sample selection 
and variable measurement, Section 4 identifies empirical methods, Section 5 
reports empirical findings and Section 6 presents concluding remarks. 
2. Research Issues  
Accounting restatements reveal to investors required corrections to 
previously reported financial statements. We studied ex-ante and ex-post trading 
response of large and small investors to accounting restatement using an event 
study approach. We also investigated the ability of small and large investors to 
use information on the characteristics of restatements. 
El-Gazzar (1998) showed that large investors rely on more pre-disclosure 
information in developing earnings expectations. This finding may extend to the 
ability of investors to anticipate accounting restatement. HJJ (2005) found that 
transient institutional investors sell shares of restated companies at least a 
quarter before the announcement and thereby avoid potential losses; in contrast, 
other types of institutional investors and individuals fail to anticipate the 
restatement and trade on days around the restatement. That is, trading by 
transient institutional investors is relatively lower in volume than other types of 
investors. 
We believe that the lower trading volume of large investors around the 
restatement announcement window occurs because they have already traded out 
of the stock HJJ (2005)4. Small investors lacking sophisticated information sources 
and knowledge possessed by large investors are not prepared to trade before 
restatement announcements that supports HJJ’s findings about institutional 
investors. There are 11 categories of reasons for accounting restatements. These 
are (1) cost or expense due to miscalculations; (2) in process research and 
                                                          
4 Our study is different from HJJ’s because we show exactly how different small and large 
traders behave around the restatement announcement window. We also show that 
different types of investors would use information within restatement announcements. By 
using the TAQ database, we are able to determine whether the initiators of trades for a 
stock are either small or large investors enabling us to refine the HJJ findings. 
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development expenses; (3) loan-loss related; (4) other (not any of the 
classification); (5) reclassification; (6) related party transactions; (7) restructuring, 
asset or inventory based; (8) improper revenue recognition; (9) securities related; 
(10) tax related; and (11) unspecified. 
Desai et al. (2006), who did not bifurcate investors by size, report that 
restatements resulting from improper revenue recognition (item #8) are most 
common (37%) and generate the largest negative equity price reaction (-14.89%). 
Restatements for improper cost recognition (item #1) cause the next largest 
equity price response (-10.51%). Restatements from all other reasons generate 
abnormal returns of (-7.98%). They find that companyprompted restatements 
result is a mean equity price change of (-11.33%) while those derived from 
auditor-prompted restatements lead to mean equity price changes of (-15.21%). 
The abnormal return associated with all other prompters, including those that 
were not identified, is (-9.34%). We are interested in understanding the trading 
behavior of large and small investors around the restatement announcement. 
Their differential understanding of restatements i.e. who prompts the 
restatement and the structure or reasons for restatements may cause important 
signaling information differences between classes of. 
3. Sample Selection and Variable Measurement  
3.1. Sample Selection  
Accounting restatement data are collected from the General Accounting 
Office’s (GAO) of restatement database. The GAO compiled a sample of 919 
restatements due to the accounting irregularities occurring between January 1, 
1997, and June 30, 2002 in US capital markets. The database includes for restating 
firms their name, ticker symbol, listing market, the restatement announcement 
date, the number of shares outstanding, the initiator or prompter of the 
restatement, and the reason(s) for the restatement. Restatements arising from 
mergers and acquisitions are excluded from our sample since those have unique 
characteristics. In addition, Easley et al. (2001) found that stock splits affect 
trading volume and since we intend to use trading volume as a metric for 
evaluating investor behavior, firms that split their stock or paid out stock 
dividends are excluded from the sample. Following Asthana et al. (2004), opening 
trade price and volume data are deleted from our sample since they may be noisy. 
Table 1 contains information about the characteristics of the restatement sample. 
The most frequent reason is revenue recognition with 46.91% weight. The next 
largest subgroup is restatements the GAO reports “unknown” as the reason for 
the announcement with 40.73% weight. Large traders may better understand the 
S. Demirkan & H. Platt / JEFA Vol:2 No:2 (2018) 29-59 
 
Page | 34 
 
causes of the unknown category of restatements because of their richer 
information sources. 
Table 1. Distribution of Reasons and Prompters in Restatement Sample 
Panel A: Distribution of Restatements by year 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
N 17 14 48 51 102 43 
Panel B: Prompters (Initiators) of Restatements 
Prompter Freq. Percent Cumulative % 
Pdum1-Auditor 14 5.09 5.09 
Pdum2-Company 104 37.82 42.91 
Pdum3-Company/FASB 2 0.73 43.64 
Pdum4-Company/SEC 2 0.73 44.36 
Pdum5-External 1 0.36 44.73 
Pdum6-FASB 1 0.36 45.09 
Pdum7-NASDAQ 1 0.36 45.45 
Pdum8-SEC 38 13.82 59.27 
Pdum9-Unknown 112 40.73 100.00 
Total 275 100.00   
Panel C: Reasons of Restatements 
Reason Freq. Percent Cumulative % 
Rdum1-Cost/Expense 32 11.64 11.64 
Rdum2-IPR&D 19 6.91 18.55 
Rdum3-Loan-Loss 1 0.36 18.91 
Rdum4-Other 17 6.18 25.09 
Rdum5-Reclassification 9 3.27 28.36 
Rdum6-Related Party. Trans 8 2.91 31.27 
Rdum7-Restructuring 38 13.82 45.09 
Rdum8-Revenue Recog. 129 46.91 92.00 
Rdum9-Securities Related 11 4.00 96.00 
Rdum10-Tax Related 3 1.09 97.09 
Rdum11-Unspecified 8 2.91 100.00 
Total 275 100.00   
Source: Restatement sample spans from 1997 to 2002 that is extracted from GAO 
(2002) Restatement report. 
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Financial statement and equity returns data for the 919 companies are taken 
from CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged-Combined Industrial Annual database for NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ firms. Trades and Quotations (TAQ) database provides 
information about individual equity trade on a second-by-second time interval 
basis. This database reports every round-lot trade and every quote from 1993 
onwards on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchange markets. Trades 
(transactions) are classified as buyer or seller initiated and then aggregated on a 
daily basis for each stock. Analysts’ reviews and forecasts are obtained from the 
IBES database. The final sample contains 275 firms after intersecting these 
databases to get necessary variables to test for our arguments. 
3.2. Variable Measurement 
There are two standard approaches for distinguishing between large and 
small traders. Cready (1988) bifurcates traders based on the number of shares 
traded. Lee (1992) instead relies on the dollar value of a transaction. Lee and 
Radhakrishnan (2000) document that dollar value based proxies of trader size are 
generally less noisy than other trade size proxies. Consequently, the dollar value 
based proxy of trader size is employed in this study along lines suggested by 
Asthana et al (2004). That is, we bifurcate small and large traders following 
Bhattacharya (2001). He assumed a trade less than or equal to $5,000 is made by 
a small investor and a trade greater than or equal to $50,000 is initiated by a large 
investor. Asthana et al. (2004) modified Bhattacharya (2001) for small investors if 
stocks are priced greater than $50 especially when investors only trade in the 
round of 100 shares or more. We may not be able to get any small traders 
classification if we just focus on dollar value approach. As in Asthana et al. (2004) 
we modify Bhattacharya (2001) for firms with a share price greater than $50 per 
share, we define small trades as those less than or equal to 100 times the share 
price. 
Abnormal volume (AVOL) measures unusual trading behavior. This study uses 
Asthana and Balsam’s (2001) measure of AVOL described in equation (1) for a 
single company. 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 − 𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)
𝜎𝜎(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) �                                                                   (1) 
where VOL is the daily trading volume measured in shares, and μ and σ are the 
corresponding mean and standard deviations calculated over 55 days beginning 
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60 days before and ending five days before the announcement of an accounting 
restatement i.e. between announcement day t-60 and t-55. 
Utilizing the method described above to bifurcate traders into large and small 
categories, AVOL is calculated for both types of traders separately as seen in 
equation (1A) and (1B) following Asthana et al. (2004) to determine how the 
abnormal volume of small and large investors for a single stock. 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) = �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − 𝜇𝜇�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
𝜎𝜎�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
�                                  (1𝐴𝐴) 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) = �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − 𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 )
𝜎𝜎(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ) �                                  (1𝐵𝐵) 
Asthana et al (2004)’s results are insensitive to the length of the estimation 
window. To measure AVOL they use a 5 day event window from t-1 to t+3 days of 
a restatement announcement where t stands for announcement day. In our event 
study, a 25 day period is used as a test period beginning 4 days before and ending 
20 days after the announcement of an accounting restatement. AVOL (SML) and 
AVOL (LRG) are calculated over this 25 day time period to observe ex-post trading 
behavior of large and small investors. 
Trading balance is also calculated to investigate whether trades are buys or 
sells. Then trading reaction is measured using variables based on net directional 
trading (i.e., net order flow). NETBUY and ANETBUY are calculated with the 
modified Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm based on execution price without the 
zero-tick test, to determine which side (buy or sell) initiated a given trade6. 
NETBUY is defined as in equation (2). 
𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = (𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙) − (𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)         (2) 
                                                          
5 This is a longer estimation period for VOL than in Asthana et al. (2004) in order to move 
to a quarter-of-a-year timeframe (approximately 60 days measurement period). 
6 The algorithm involves matching a trade to the most recent quote that precedes the 
trade by at least 5 seconds. If a price is nearer the bid price it is classified as seller initiated 
and if it is closer to the ask price it is classified as buyer initiated. If a trade is at the 
midpoint of the bid-ask spread, it is classified based on the previous price. In this case, a 
tick test is used, that is, if the trade occurs at a price that is higher (lower) than the price of 
the previous trade, it is classified as buyer (seller) initiated. 
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NETBUY values are calculated for small and large traders separately similar to 
the procedure above for AVOL for each firm. The estimation period for NETBUY is 
from 60 day prior to 5 day before the restatement announcement day (t-60 to t-5) 
to find historical values for NETBUY. Then during the test period distribution of 
buyers and sellers is calculated between 4 days prior to the announcement and 
ending 20 days after the restatement. Daily mean and median tests are applied to 
compare the trading behaviors of each investor group in the 25 days test period. 
AVOL alone might be misleading since it does not explain deviations in 
trading volume. Further insights are gained from ANETBUY which estimates trade 
direction to measure the risk avoidance behavior of different type of investors. 
Trading volume ANETBUY is defined as in equation (3) and calculated as total buy 
minus total sell divided by the standard deviation of total buy minus total sell 
calculated over the estimation period as follows: 
𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = (𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙 −  𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙)
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 (𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 − 𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆)         (3) 
where TBTS stands for total buy trading size and TSTS stands for total sell trading 
size. We normalized raw trade initiation variables to determine the abnormal 
netbuy levels and to adjust for standard differences between small and large 
trade initiation patterns. We followed the procedure in equation (3) to calculate 
the test period values between restatement announcement day -4 and +20. An 
abnormally high level of buyer (seller) initiated trades indicates overall buying 
(selling) pressure and a positive (negative) reaction by stock traders. 
3.3. Cumulative market adjusted abnormal return (CAR) 
The GAO (2002) report notes that restatement announcements result in 
substantial abnormal returns. Cumulative market adjusted abnormal returns 
(CARs) are calculated over various windows around the announcement date to 
observe buy and hold returns for different periods. The CAR of the ith stock, CARi,t, 
is obtained by subtracting the normal or expected return (R) in the absence of the 
event, E(Rit) from the actual return in the event period as follows in equation (4): 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇)                                                                 (4) 
A market model equation is used to estimate the alpha and beta needed to 
calculate expected return value in equation (5). 
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇 + 𝜀𝜀𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇                                                                 (5) 
where t= -250,………..,-11, αi is the constant term for the ith stock, βi is the market 
beta of the ith stock, Rm,t is the market return, and εi,t is an error term in the 
regression. 
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We calculated CARs as in equation (6) for several different periods around 
the restatement announcement period to determine the effect of a restatement 
announcement on stock prices in different buy and hold scenarios. 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇(𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇) − 𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇(𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇) ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇                         (6) 
where t interval is changed according to the desired CAR calculation. 
Hribar and Jenkins (2004) also calculated CAR over various time spans. In our 
study the immediate market response is captured with CAR(-2,2), CAR(-1,0), CAR(-
1,1), CAR(0,1), CAR(0,30), CAR(0,60), and CAR(-30,30). Following Hribar et al. 
(2005), longer term responses is also calculated with CAR(-40,-3), CAR(-50,-3), 
CAR(-60,-3), CAR(-250,-3), CAR(3,30) and CAR(3,250). 
4. Empirical Methods and Analysis 
4.1. Incremental trading response of small and large traders 
Trading response around the announcement of an accounting restatement is 
a significant event for management, investors and regulators. The research 
method that we employ investigates day-by-day mean AVOL (abnormal trading 
volume) for companies making accounting restatements to determine 
incremental trading response of small and large traders. For large and small 
investors, daily AVOL (normal trading volume holding other things constant) is 
compared to AVOL on the announcement day to detect abnormal trading 
response from the mean. The event period spans day -4 to day 20 to investigate 
the trading behaviors of investors. Table 2 documents daily mean AVOL for both 
small and large investors over observation days (-1,3). 
Prior to the announcement, we expect small investors to have larger AVOL 
than large investors because of their delayed response to the accounting 
restatement in comparison to large investors. A daily mean test compares mean 
AVOL for each observation day for each trader type. As expected, AVOL for small 
investors is bigger than for large investors and is significantly different from large 
traders’ AVOL at the 1% level around announcement date7. This univariate result 
may not be conclusive about the relationship between investor type and trading 
volume because other firm characteristics also vary for each firm on average8. 
                                                          
7 AVOL for small and large investors are highly skewed. Skewness is also found after the 
announcement date. 
8 For example, as seen in Table 2, MSAVOL has a mean (median) 1.00 (0.48) that indicates 
a right skewed distribution. Average (median) MLAVOL is 0.44 (0.00) and on average 
MSAVOL is bigger than the MLAVOL. LNMVE has a mean (median) value of 4.61 (0.54). 
LNBV has a mean (median) value of 0.69 (0.14). LNMB which is the natural logarithm of 
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Therefore, the inferred relationship is next tested with a multivariate regression 
analysis controlling for differential firm characteristics. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Variable Observation Mean STD Median 
MSAVOL 275 1.00*** 7.29 0.48 
MLAVOL 275 0.44*** 6.80 0.00 
LMVE 275 4.61*** 13.80 0.54 
LBV 275 0.69*** 2.52 0.14 
LMB 275       2.26 6.48 2.10 
SALESGROWTH 275 1.12*** 0.57 1.06 
LEV 275 0.45*** 0.23 0.43 
MAR 275 1.05*** 0.96 0.89 
CORR 275 0.20*** 0.49 0.23 
FOLLOW 275 11.23*** 10.11 8.00 
ERROR 275 -0.06*** 0.27 -0.01 
STDREVISE 275 0.04*** 0.06 0.02 
Notes: The sample contains 275 restatement announcements between 197 and 2002. The 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. MSAVOL 
is mean AVOL in days (-1,3) around the restatement date for small investors. MLAVOL is 
the same variable for large investors. AVOL is daily volume of trades in the event period 
minus mean daily volume of traders in estimation period (-60,-5) divided by standard 
deviation of trades in estimation period. LMVE is the natural logarithm of market value of 
common equity. LBV is the natural logarithm of book value of common equity. LMB is the 
natural logarithm of market to book ratio calculated by MVE divided by BV. SALESGROW is 
                                                                                                                                                    
the market to book ratio has a mean (median) of 2.26 (2.10). Average (median) sales 
growth is 1.12 (1.06) which shows a 12% increase in sales over time. Leverage mean 
(median) is 0.45 (0.43) indicating total debt is 45% of total equity. MAR which is one plus 
the market-adjusted stock return for the fiscal year has an average (median) value of 1.05 
(0.89) which indicates on average restated firms have a positive return of 5%. CORR is the 
correlation between annual stock return and earnings per share and the average (median) 
value is 0.20 (0.23) which shows a positive correlation between earnings and stock return 
which is consistent with the MAR measure. On average (median) 11.23 (8.00) analysts 
follow restated firms. Error is the forecast errors of the analyst and it has a mean (median) 
value of -0.06 (-0.01) which indicates that on average analysts estimate lower 
performance than the actual one. STDREVISE, the standard deviation of forecast revision, 
has a mean (median) value of 0.04 (0.02) which is a small standard deviation from the 
mean compared to (Bens and Monahan, 2004). Table 3 reports the correlation table for 
control variables which are significantly correlated with each other at conventional levels. 
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current year sales divided by prior-year-sale. LEV is LEVERAGE which is defined as book 
value of long-term liabilities plus short-term liabilities deflated by total asset. MAR is one 
plus the market-adjusted stock return for the fiscal year that is calculated from CRSP daily 
database. CORR is historical correlation between annual stock returns and earnings per 
share-EPS computed over the preceding 10 years. FOLLOW is an average monthly analyst 
following per IBES in a year. ERROR is the negative of the absolute value of the IBES 
consensus analyst forecast error divided by stock price at the beginning of the year. 
STDREVISE is a standard deviation of changes over the fiscal year in the median IBES 
forecast from the preceding month and divided by stock price at the beginning of the year. 
Table 3. Pearson Product Monet (Lower left) and Spearmen (Upper right) 
Correlations between the control variables 
  
SALES 
GROWTH LEV MAR CORR FOLLOW ERROR 
STD 
REVISE LMVE LMB 
SALES 
GROWTH   -0.127* 0.563* 0.027* 0.027* -0.101* -0.010* 0.058* 0.176* 
LEV -0.152*   -0.098* 0.018* -0.078* 0.231* 0.087* -0.003* 0.076* 
MAR 0.262* -0.105*   0.023* 0.100* -0.103* -0.204* 0.178* 0.243* 
CORR 0.008* 0.092* 0.010*   0.018* 0.087* 0.106* -0.048* -0.125* 
FOLLOW 0.037* -0.086* 0.030* 0.026*   -0.097* -0.043* 0.431* 0.167* 
ERROR -0.093* 0.117* -0.113* 0.113* -0.100*   0.542* -0.176* -0.169* 
STDREVISE -0.097* 0.164* -0.101* 0.095* -0.090* 0.787*   -0.124* -0.053* 
LMVE 0.072* -0.029* 0.276* -0.050* 0.732* -0.242* -0.225*   0.275* 
LMB 0.251* 0.052* 0.311* -0.038* 0.222* -0.092* -0.071* 0.389*   
Notes: The sample contains 275 restatement announcements between 197 and 
2002. The * indicates significance at 1% levels. Definitions for variables are given 
in table 2. 
Table 4 Panel A presents abnormal trading volume reactions around 
restatement announcement dates. For small investors, mean AVOL on all days 
starting at -4 to day 20 are significantly different than their average expected 
AVOL for the same number of days at the 1% level. Mean AVOL(SMALL) is highest 
on days 0 and 1 and then decreases afterwards. Figure 1 graphs this trading 
pattern and appears to indicate that small investors are surprised by restatement 
announcements and they responded to this "new information" by increasing their 
trades significantly in comparison to their normal trading patterns. 
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Figure 1. AVOL Around the Announcement Date for Small and Large Traders 
Notes: AVOLSML follows red line, while AVOLBIG follows blue line. 
Large traders, by contrast, respond significantly different than their expected 
trading size only on day -1, 0, 1, and 2 with mean AVOL of 0.343, 2.994, 2.795, 
0.877 and 0.620 respectively. The trading behavior of large traders suggests that 
big investors are not surprised from restatement announcement news. Large 
traders do not respond differently on days other than -1 through 2 presumably 
because they interpret restatement characteristics with more accuracy than do 
small investors. Since they trade before the event window they may do less 
trading in the window. Time series characteristics of large and small traders are 
reported in Table 4 Panel B. Small traders have a significantly larger response to 
restatements than do larger traders. However, neither small nor large traders 
exhibit any trend in trading behavior.  
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Table 4. Trading Volume 
Panel A: Trading volume around the date of restatement announcement 
Day Mean AVOL(SML) Mean AVOL(LARGE) Small-Large 
-4 0.154** 0.088 0.067 
-3 0.456*** 0.157 0.298 
-2 0.525*** 0.348 0.176 
-1 0.431*** 0.343** 0.087 
0 3.979*** 2.994** 0.985 
1 3.863*** 2.795** 1.068 
2 1.977*** 0.877** 1.099*** 
3 1.611*** 0.981 0.630 
4 0.981*** 0.620* 0.360 
5 0.877*** 0.194 0.683*** 
6 0.690*** 0.118 0.571*** 
7 0.645*** 0.159 0.486*** 
8 0.679*** 0.829 0.596*** 
9 0.662*** 0.013 0.649*** 
10 0.589*** 0.094 0.496*** 
11 0.606*** 0.064 0.542*** 
12 0.648*** 0.119 0.384*** 
13 0.702*** 0.069 0.632*** 
14 0.681*** 0.162 0.519*** 
15 0.632*** 0.016 0.615*** 
16 0.714*** 0.173 0.540*** 
17 0.642*** 0.320 0.322 
18 0.725*** 0.078 0.647*** 
19 0.820*** 0.206 0.614** 
20 0.773*** 0.098 0.675*** 
Panel B: Mean AVOL by year 
Year N AVON(SML) AVOL(LARGE) 
1997 17 1.012*** 0.202 
1998 14 7.058* 2.768 
1999 48 1.345*** 0.563*** 
2000 51 5.376*** 3.821*** 
2001 102 0.835*** 0.598*** 
2002 43 1.220*** 0.698*** 
Notes: The sample contains 275 restatement announcements between 197 and 2002. The 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
AVOL(SML) indicates mean AVOL for small traders, and AVOL(LARGE) mean AVOL for large 
traders. 
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4.2. Impact of prompters and reasons of restatement on investor’s 
differential trading response 
In this section we investigate whether small and large investor trading 
depends more on who prompts a restatement than on the reasons for the 
restatement. 
4.2.1. Impact of prompters (initiators) of accounting restatement 
Nine prompters of restatements according to the GAO (2002) report are (1) 
auditor initiated; (2) company voluntarily initiated; (3) company initiated 
according to FASB regulation; (4) company initiated according to SEC 
recommendation; (5) external parties such as Federal Reserve or media initiated; 
(6) FASB initiated; (7) NASDAQ initiated; (8) SEC initiated and (9) unknown or not 
specified because SEC filing does not clearly state who actually discovered the 
misstatement. 
Prompter of a restatement may have impact on investor behavior because 
this information may have signaling value and may be used differently by various 
types of investors. Categorical variables for each of the nine types of restatement 
prompters are created to measure who prompted a restatement. To measure 
small and large investor response to restatements, average abnormal volume for 
large and small investors, MLAVOL and MSAVOL, are calculated as stated earlier. 
These measures are calculated as in equations (7A and 7B) between day -1 and 3. 
These variables represent average AVOL for each investor type. These variables 
summarize the investors’ response to restatements. 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 15�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑇𝑇3
−1                                           (7𝐴𝐴) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 15�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑇𝑇3
−1                                           (7𝐵𝐵) 
After calculating the mean trading behaviors of different types of investors, 
regressions models are run with MSAVOL and MLAVOL as dependent variables 
and the nine categorical variables of prompters as independent variables. Other 
forces are known to affect the behavior of large and small traders. Bens and 
Monahan (2004) introduces control variables for firm capital structure, 
performance, and the information environment. These additional control 
variables are introduced into the multivariate analysis. Capital structure is 
measured by leverage (LEV) which is total debt divided by total equity; firm 
performance is measured by sales growth (SALESGROWTH) which is calculated as 
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current year sales divided by prior year sale and by market adjusted stock returns 
(MAR) which is one plus the market-adjusted stock return for the fiscal year; and 
the information environment is measured by the correlation between annual 
stock return and earnings per share (CORR) computed over the preceding 10 
years, number of analyst following a company (FOLLOW) is the average monthly 
number of analyst following a company for the fiscal year, forecast error (ERROR) 
ERROR is the negative of the absolute value of the IBES consensus analyst forecast 
error divided by stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year, and the standard 
deviation of earnings forecast revisions (STDREVISE) is the standard deviation of 
changes over the fiscal year in the median analysts’ forecast from the preceding 
month divided by stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year a. These firm 
control variables characteristics such as the information environment, 
performance measures, and capital structure as in equation 8A and 8B below9. 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼0 + �𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇9
𝑇𝑇=1 � � 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇,𝑗𝑗 ,𝑇𝑇
2002
𝑇𝑇=1997
275
𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝛼𝛼12𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 + 𝛼𝛼13𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵+ 𝛼𝛼14𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼15𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 + 𝛼𝛼16𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛼𝛼17𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆+ 𝛼𝛼18𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 + 𝜀𝜀𝑇𝑇                                                            (8𝐴𝐴) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼0 + �𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇9
𝑇𝑇=1 � � 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇 ,𝑗𝑗 ,𝑇𝑇
2002
𝑇𝑇=1997
275
𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝛼𝛼12𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 + 𝛼𝛼13𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵+ 𝛼𝛼14𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼15𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 + 𝛼𝛼16𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛼𝛼17𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆+ 𝛼𝛼18𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 + 𝜐𝜐𝑇𝑇                                                            (8𝐵𝐵) 
where LMVE is natural logarithm of market value of equity which is calculated as 
closing price of the stock at the end of the year multiplied by number of shares 
outstanding. LMB is natural logarithm of the market to book (market value of 
equity divided by book value of equity) ratio. Table 5 Panel A contains estimates 
for MLAVOL (Mean Large traders’ AVOL) and MSAVOL (Mean Small traders’ AVOL) 
and coefficient estimates from estimating equation (8A) and (8B) and other 
regression statistics. The difference between small and large investor’s values is 
significant at the 1% level. 
Small investors treat company induced restatements and those labeled as 
unknown as the most important. The multivariate regression for small investors 
finds that the categorical variables for the initiator of restatements Pdum2 
(company voluntary initiated restatement prompter), Pdum3 (company prompted 
on the advice of the FASB), and Pdum9 (unknown prompter) have coefficient 
                                                          
9 Capital structure proxies the principal-agent issue at the firm. 
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estimates of 5.083, 1.160 and 2.039 respectively, all of which are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
The corresponding result for large investors is somewhat different. With 
MLAVOL as the dependent variable most of the restatement indicator variables 
are significant determinants of AVOL. Pdum2 (company voluntary initiated) with 
an estimated coefficient of 1.642, Pdum3 (company/FASB initiated) with an 
estimated coefficient of 0.933, and Pdum7 (NASDAQ) with an estimated 
coefficient of 2.382 are all significant at 1% level. Pdum4 (company/SEC initiated) 
with a coefficient estimate of 1.028 and Pdum9 (unknown) with the coefficient of 
0.742 are significant at a 5% level. Pdum1 (auditor initiated restatement) with an 
estimated coefficient of 2.469 and Pdum8 (SEC initiated) with a coefficient of 
0.749 are significant at a 10% level. These results appear to indicate that large 
investors value knowing exactly who is prompting restatements; they appear to 
be less interested in knowing about external and FASB initiations. In summary, as 
seen in the last column in Table 5, with all control variables included, large 
investors are affected by almost all, seven out of nine, types of restatement 
prompters. On the other hand, for small investors with MSAVOL as the dependent 
variable only three out of nine types of prompters have significant coefficient 
estimates. For models explaining large and small trader behavior, coefficient 
estimates are generally positive and adjusted R-squares range between 4% and 
15%. 
4.2.2. Impact of reasons for accounting restatements  
We examine whether investor’s trading is influenced by who prompted the 
restatement. Our analysis starts by introducing the reasons for the restatement. 
As noted above there are 11 reasons identified by the GAO why firms restate. 
They are (1) Cost/Expense, (2) IPR&D, (3) Loan-loss, (4) Other, (5) reclassification, 
(6) related party transaction, (7) restructuring, (8) revenue recognition, (9) 
securities related, (10) tax related and (11) unspecified.  
Table 5 Panel B contains regression results when the differential trading 
response of investors is regressed against the 11 reasons for restatements. The 11 
reasons are included in the regression model as categorical variables similar to the 
earlier prompters analysis. Seven additional variables are included in the model to 
control for individual firm characteristics similar to those used in the prompter 
regressions in table 5 Panel A. The regression equations including the 11 
categorical variables describing the reasons for restatements on large and small 
investors are: 
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𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼0 + �𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇11
𝑇𝑇=1 � � 𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇,𝑗𝑗 ,𝑇𝑇
2002
𝑇𝑇=1997
275
𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝛼𝛼12𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 + 𝛼𝛼13𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵+ 𝛼𝛼14𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼15𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 + 𝛼𝛼16𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛼𝛼17𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆+ 𝛼𝛼18𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 + 𝜀𝜀𝑇𝑇                                                            (9𝐴𝐴) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼0 + �𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇11
𝑇𝑇=1 � � 𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇,𝑗𝑗 ,𝑇𝑇
2002
𝑇𝑇=1997
275
𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝛼𝛼12𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 + 𝛼𝛼13𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵+ 𝛼𝛼14𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼15𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 + 𝛼𝛼16𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛼𝛼17𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆+ 𝛼𝛼18𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 + 𝜐𝜐𝑇𝑇                                                            (9𝐵𝐵) 
where Rdum is a reason dummy for each reason why firms’ restate their financial 
statements. The value of reason dummy equals one for a specific reason and zero 
otherwise. Other control variable definitions have already been provided at the 
previous section. Large investor trading behavior is influenced by the reason for 
the restatement as seen in Table 5 Panel B. Statistically significant positive 
coefficients are estimated for 3 of 11 categorical variables for large investors. A 
positive coefficient on these categorical variables indicates that the reason 
increases investor’s average trading volume. Rdum2 (R&D), Rdum4 (Other) and 
Rdum8 (Revenue recognition) are all statistically significant determinants of large 
investor trading volume. Of the other seven variables included in the regression 
only MAR is significant. 
For small investors, only 1 out of 11 coefficients estimated on the categorical 
variables is marginally statistically significant (lost-loan) at the 10% level. The 
significance of the seven non categorical variables is not conclusive. Comparing 
Table 5 Panel A with Panel B, small investors appear to give more importance to 
who has motivated the restatement than to the reason for the restatement, while 
larger investors are influenced by both types of causes These results support our 
contention about a differential trading response between small and large traders. 
Small investor overreaction to restatements may be explained by their lack of 
knowledge. Since large investors consider both who initiated and the reasons for 
the restatement suggests a) that the two factors bring different and unique 
signals to the market and b) that these signals are valued differently by different 
investor classes.  
Comparing adjusted R-squares for the two types of regressions (who 
prompted and the reason) indicates that small investors give more importance, 
based on the absolute size of the R-square, to who prompted a restatement than 
to the reason for the restatement. The opposite conclusion appears to hold for 
large traders. That is, they give attention to both reasons and prompters. These 
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empirical findings support Kim and Verrecchia’s (1991) theory regarding the 
different interpretation to the same information of various classes of investors. 
Table 5. Multivariate Analysis for Prompters and Reasons 
Panel A: Multivariate Analysis for Prompters 
Variable MSAVOL MLAVOL MSAVOL MLAVOL MSAVOL MLAVOL 
Aditor 10.591 (1.41) 
1.110 
(0.81) 
9.200 
(1.54) 
2.313* 
(1.87) 
9.297 
(1.54) 
2.469* 
(1.90) 
Company 5.438*** (3.00) 
0.107 
(0.21) 
4.974*** 
(2.62) 
1.502*** 
(2.86) 
5.083** 
(2.52) 
1.642*** 
(2.90) 
Company/FASB 2.376** (1.89) 
-0.520 
(-1.26) 
1.021** 
(2.07) 
0.756*** 
(3.35) 
1.160** 
(1.98) 
0.933*** 
(4.98) 
Company/SEC 3.808*** (2.62) 
-0.285 
(-0.63) 
2.038 
(1.47) 
0.947** 
(2.46) 
2.109 
(1.54) 
1.028** 
(2.53) 
External 2.366 (1.24) 
-1.113** 
(-2.17) 
3.219 
(1.23) 
0.454 
(0.89) 
3.284 
(1.20) 
0.0585 
(1.14) 
FASB 1.039 (0.95) 
-1.411*** 
(-4.51) 
0.895 
(0.56) 
-0.892 
(-1.56) 
0.745 
(0.85) 
-0.845 
(1.14) 
NASDAQ 1.552 (0.95) 
0.023 
(0.56) 
1.880 
(0.82) 
1.802*** 
(3.04) 
2.325 
(0.84) 
2.382*** 
(2.89) 
SEC 2.414** (2.25) 
-0.708** 
(-2.03) 
1.720 
(1.57) 
0.678* 
(1.92) 
1.779 
(1.58) 
0.749* 
(2.10) 
Unknown 2.659** (2.21) 
-0.711* 
(-1.89) 
1.974* 
(1.85) 
0.668** 
(2.13) 
2.039** 
(1.84) 
0.742** 
(2.25) 
LMVE -0.265 (-1.36) 
0.085 
(1.19) 
-0.118 
(-0.32) 
0.061 
(0.55) 
-0.127 
(-0.31) 
0.075 
(0.67) 
LMB 0.840 (1.43) 
0.094 
(0.64) 
0.941 
(1.47) 
0.136 
(0.87) 
0.944 
(1.47) 
0.136 
(0.88) 
SALESGROW   0.545 (0.46) 
-0.055 
(-0.19) 
0.532 
(0.44) 
-0.046 
(-0.16) 
MAR   -0.858** (-1.86) 
-0.172* 
(-1.77) 
-0.854* 
(-1.84) 
-0.168* 
(-1.72) 
LEV   -0.365 (-0.15) 
-0.029 
(-0.05) 
-0.287 
(-0.12) 
-0.008 
(-0.01) 
CORR   -3.157* (-1.83) 
-0.522 
(-1.38) 
-3.164* 
(-1.80) 
-0.551 
(-1.45) 
FOLLOW   -0.021 (-0.35) 
0.008 
(0.40) 
-0.020 
(-0.32) 
0.007 
(0.36) 
ERROR     0.611 (0.44) 
1.105* 
(1.90) 
STDREVISE     -0.386 (-0.61) 
-0.445 
(-1.61) 
Adj R-square 0.089 0.044 0.146 0.060 0.147 0.064 
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Panel B: Multivariate Analysis for Reasons 
Variable MSAVOL MBAVOL MSAVOL MBAVOL MSAVOL MBAVOL 
Cost/Expense 0.912 
(1.18) 
0.341 
(1.29) 
0.249 
(0.23) 
0.295 
(1.04) 
0.296 
(0.27) 
0.215 
(0.77) 
IPR&D 0.949 
(1.06) 
0.512** 
(2.25) 
2.028 
(1.30) 
0.850*** 
(2.68) 
2.059 
(1.32) 
0.806** 
(2.32) 
Loan-Loss -0.487 
(-1.10) 
0.463*** 
(26.55) 
-6.443* 
(-1.77) 
-0.378 
(-0.50) 
-6.39* 
(-1.76) 
-0.438 
(-0.57) 
Other 3.189* 
(1.79) 
1.449** 
(2.16) 
3.168* 
(1.77) 
1.501** 
(2.08) 
3.196* 
(1.81) 
1.464** 
(2.00) 
Reclassification 1.785 
(1.35) 
0.556* 
(1.74) 
1.003 
(0.56) 
0.482 
(1.06) 
1.001 
(0.56) 
0.484 
(1.00) 
Rel. Party Trn. 2.147 
(1.38) 
1.602* 
(1.70) 
1.160 
(0.56) 
1.578* 
(1.67) 
1.225 
(0.59) 
1.494 
(1.54) 
Restructuring 1.638 
(1.41) 
0.427 
(1.48) 
0.613 
(0.46) 
0.331 
(1.11) 
0.679 
(0.50) 
0.226 
(0.68) 
Revenue Rec. 2.972* 
(1.90) 
1.116*** 
(2.67) 
2.160 
(1.54) 
1.074*** 
(2.89) 
2.196 
(1.56) 
1.027*** 
(2.65) 
Securities Rel. 0.589 
(0.58) 
0.084 
(0.37) 
1.111 
(0.74) 
0.234 
(0.68) 
1.175 
(0.78) 
0.159 
(0.42) 
Tax Related 0.012 
(0.56) 
0.011 
(0.98) 
0.425 
(0.85) 
0.315 
(0.94) 
0.256 
(0.78) 
0.006 
(0.82) 
Unspecified 3.872 
(1.24) 
3.124 
(1.15) 
4.845 
(1.49) 
3.576 
(1.34) 
4.912 
(1.51) 
2.498 
(1.31) 
LMVE -0.396 
(-1.46) 
0.039 
(0.53) 
-0.292 
(-0.70) 
0.010 
(0.09) 
-0.299 
(-0.66) 
0.032 
(0.28) 
LMB 0.779 
(1.21) 
0.086 
(0.58) 
0.907 
(1.39) 
0.147 
(0.94) 
0.907 
(1.38) 
0.146 
(0.92) 
SALESGROW   0.639 
(0.52) 
0.195 
(0.06) 
0.631 
(0.50) 
0.041 
(0.13) 
MAR   -1.196* 
(-1.96) 
-0.316** 
(-1.97) 
-1.197* 
(-1.96) 
-0.318** 
(-1.94) 
LEV   1.324 
(0.56) 
0.324 
(0.57) 
1.295 
(0.54) 
0.327 
(0.57) 
CORR   -3.324* 
(-1.76) 
-0.475 
(-1.17) 
-3.313* 
(-1.74) 
-0.494 
(-1.22) 
FOLLOW   -0.004 
(-0.06) 
0.013 
(0.62) 
-0.003 
(-0.05) 
0.011 
(0.53) 
ERROR     -0.500 
(-0.33) 
0.747 
(1.31) 
STDREVISE     0.190 
(0.26) 
-0.200 
(-0.80) 
Adj R-Square 0.032 0.047 0.099 0.072 0.099 0.075 
Notes: The t-statistics in parenthesis based on the Huber-White-Sandwich procedure for correcting 
the standard errors for time-series, serial-correlation (see Petersen, 2005). The * indicates 
significance at 1% level. Pdums and Rdums are sets of dummy variables for prompters and for 
reasons of restatement which are shown in table1 Panel B. They get the value of 1 if the prompter 
(reason) is that type of prompter (reason) 0 otherwise. E.g. if prompter (reason of restatement) is 
Auditor (Cost/Expense) then Pdum1 (Rdum1) gets the value of 1 and value 0 otherwise. 
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4.3. NETBUY Activities of Small and Large Investors 
Table 6 shows selling and buying behaviors of different classes of investors 
i.e. large and small. Net buy measures the direction of trades and has a positive 
value if the buying exceeds the selling. As seen in Panel B of Table 6, small 
investors buy 3 days prior to restatements, and buy again after the restatement at 
days 9 and 14. Interestingly, large investors significantly buy also 3 days prior to a 
restatement announcement, and after the restatement at days 4, 17 and 20. The 
other trading days trading behaviors are not significant. Comparing small and 
large traders on day 4, large traders buy more than small traders while on day 9, 
small investors buy more than large investors; this may be the response of small 
investors to large investors excessive buying behavior at day 4. The other trading 
days are not significantly different from each other for small and large investors 
according to our net buy analysis. 
Table 6. Net Buy Activities of Small and Big Investors’ Around the Date of 
Restatement Announcement Day 
Panel A: Net Buy Activities of Small/Big Investors’ Around Date of Restatement Announcement 
 Mean Netbuy-Small Mean Netbuy-Large Mean Small-Large 
-4 0.033 0.240 -0.206 
-3 0.091* 0.191* -0.009 
-2 0.064 0.075 -0.010 
-1 -0.014 0.059 -0.738 
0 -0.051 -0.509 0.458 
1 0.146 0.249 -0.102 
2 0.111 0.043 0.068 
3 0.074 -0.158 0.232 
4 0.016 0.444* -0.430* 
5 -0.051 -0.016 -0.035 
6 -0.014 0.052 -0.066 
7 0.035 0.099 -0.065 
8 0.027 0.094 -0.067 
9 0.154*** -0.041 0.195* 
10 -0.041 -0.053 0.012 
11 0.016 0.106 -0.089 
12 -0.236 -0.434 0.197 
13 0.064 0.156 -0.093 
14 0.100* 0.258 -0.158 
15 0.025 -0.105 0.129 
16 -0.065 -0.003 -0.061 
17 0.090 0.188** -0.097 
18 -0.057 -0.115 0.057 
19 -0.166 0.295 -0.461 
20 -0.166 0.230* -0.396 
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Panel B: Abnormal Net Buy Activities of Small/Big Investors’ Around Date of Restatement Announ. 
 Mean AVOL Netbuy-Small Mean AVOL Netbuy-Large Mean AVOL Small-Large 
-4 -0.126 0.003 -0.130 
-3 -0.050 -0.048 0.001 
-2 -0.072 0.084 -0.161 
-1 -0.081 -0.009 -0.072 
0 0.432 -0.671** 1.145** 
1 0.475* 0.351 0.103 
2 0.442** 0.226 0.202 
3 0.133 0.214 -0.095 
4 -0.045 0.139 -0.192 
5 -0.137 0.019 -0.158 
6 -0.140 -0.014 -0.125 
7 -0.220* 0.072 -0.298* 
8 -0.101 -0.068 -0.028 
9 0.228* -0.131 0.367** 
10 -0.054 0.004 -0.057 
11 0.097 -0.021 0.119 
12 -0.174 -0.006 -0.168 
13 0.067 -0.077 0.148 
14 0.102 -0.147 0.257 
15 -0.016 0.037 -0.055 
16 -0.174 -0.002 -0.172 
17 0.004 0.196** -0.205 
18 -0.051 -0.114 0.071 
19 -0.002 0.015 -0.018 
20 -0.072 0.209* -0.295 
Notes: The sample contains 275 restatement announcements between 1997 and 2002. The ***,** 
and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Net buy is calculated as total buy 
minus total sell in the trading day divided by average total buy plus total sell calculated in the 
estimation period (-60,-5). AVOL Net buy is calculated as total buy minus total sell in the trading day 
divided by average total buy minus total sells divided by standard deviation of total buy minus total 
sales calculated in the estimation period (-60,-5). 
Table 6 Panel B documents the abnormal trading behaviors for small and 
large traders. ANETBUY takes into consideration normal trading behaviors of 
investors before the restatement announcement. According to Panel B, small 
trader’s ANETBUY are positive on days 1, 2 and 9 just after the announcement 
day. Small investors appear to make abnormally buys after the announcement 
day. The reason for this buying behavior may be decreased price of restated 
companies stocks. On the other hand large traders sell abnormally at the 
restatement day which may explain why stock prices of restated companies 
decrease. Interestingly large traders buy abnormally more at days 17 and 20. This 
may show large traders repositioning back into restated company’s stocks 
because bad events did happen, and their recurrence is unlikely in the near 
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future. This result supports Platt’s (2006) contention of mean reversion of stock 
prices. Comparing mean abnormal trading behaviors of small and large trader we 
observe that large traders sell more on the announcement day, and on day 7, but 
they they buy more at trading day 9. Other trading days are not significantly 
different from each other for small and large investors. 
Figure 2 graph the abnormal netbuy trading behaviors of small and large 
traders. According to this figure small investors buy abnormally starting day -1 to 
3, and then start selling from day 4 to 8. Staring on day 9 their buying behaviors 
are mixed. Large traders sell significantly at the announcement day, and day 17. 
They start buying at day 1, 2, 3, 4 then they do not buy or sell significantly until 
day 17 which is consistent with risk avoidance and waiting for the realization of 
their expectations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. ANETBUY around the Announcement Date 
 
4.4. Transaction Size and Investors’ Classification 
The literature reports that large investors are more sophisticated, and trade 
accordingly. Cready (1988) noted a higher mean transaction size around earning 
announcement-periods compared to non-announcement periods. He attributed 
that result to a greater relative trading response by wealthier (large) investors 
than by small investors. His finding is consistent with Ohlson’s (1975) proposition 
that information value increases with investor wealth. Hribar and Jenkins (2004) 
found abnormally high trading in a short announcement window of 5 days. 
Palmrose et al. (2004) report similar results for 2 day trading windows. Overall, 
prior research suggests that compared to small investors, large sophisticated 
investors are more concerned about the predictability of future earnings and 
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dislike uncertainty. Large investors resolve this need by using more sophisticated 
estimation techniques. 
Cready (1988) argued that size-related differences in announcement of 
accounting restatement usage rates are reflected in announcement-day daily 
mean transaction size. Mean transaction size (MTR) is calculated for small and 
large investors by dividing the number of shares traded per day by the number of 
transactions per day following Cready (1988) as seen in equations (10A and 10B). 
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 (𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑇𝑇 ,𝑇𝑇 = 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠# 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵                                         (10𝐴𝐴) 
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 (𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑇𝑇 ,𝑇𝑇 = 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠# 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵                                        (10𝐵𝐵) 
Calculated values of MTR are then explained as a function of trading day 
during the year (values between 1 and 261) to be able to determine expected 
MTR for each investor type (Equation 11A and 11B). 
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 (𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑇𝑇 ,𝑇𝑇 = 𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 + 𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇(𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇) + 𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇                                                     (11𝐴𝐴) 
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 (𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑇𝑇 ,𝑇𝑇 = 𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇) + 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇                                                     (11𝐵𝐵) 
where MTR (Large)it is the mean transaction size in shares for transactions 
occurring in firm i’s stock on day t for large investor group; MTR (Small)it is the 
mean transaction size in shares for transactions occurring in firm i’s stock on day t 
for small investor group; DAYt is the day of trading per the daily CRSP tape i.e. 
numbering the trading days starting from January from 1 to 255, then using that 
number as the value for DAY variable; ai and ci are intercepts; bi and di are slope 
terms for firm i; and ei and vi are error terms of equations. 
Following Cready and Mynatt (1991), mean transaction size is estimated 
using 201 days of data centered on the restatement’s announcement date after 
which “Unexpected Mean Transaction Size” (UMTR) is calculated for large and 
small investors by differencing expected MTR (derived from equations (11A and 
11B) from actual MTR (equations 10A and 10B). 
𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 (𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 (𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇(𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 (𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇)                     (12𝐴𝐴) 
𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 (𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 (𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇(𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 (𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇)                    (12𝐵𝐵) 
where UMTR (Small) is unexpected mean transaction size in shares for 
transactions occurring in firm i on day t for the small investor group; and UMTR 
(Large) is unexpected mean transaction size in shares for transactions occurring in 
firm i’s stock on day t for the big investor group. 
S. Demirkan & H. Platt / JEFA Vol:2 No:2 (2018) 29-59 
 
Page | 53 
 
Unexpected mean number of transactions is calculated daily from day -9 to 
day +10 around the restatement announcement date. These data are stratified by 
transaction size. Table 7 panels A and B report mean transaction response and 
unexpected mean transaction response of different type of investors respectively. 
Mean transaction response residuals for each investor type are reported in Table 
7 Panel A. Unexpected mean transaction response residuals for each investor 
group are derived from time-series regressions where the dependent variables 
are daily mean transaction size in shares calculated for large and small investor; 
the independent variable is trading day (per CRSP day of the trade). A mean test, 
shown in Table 7 panel B, is used to test whether number of mean UMTR for small 
investors are larger than the number of UMTR for all investors. We find significant 
differences between small investors and all other investor types. The significant 
mean test result lends support to the idea that small investors trade more 
intensively around the restatement announcement in comparison to other 
investors. In summary we find that small traders have different mean transaction 
response around the restatement announcement event window than other 
investors. 
 
Table 7. Mean transaction response and size 
Panel A: Mean Unexpected Numbers of Transaction 
 Small Mean Small Median Large Mean Large Median 
-10 -0.07* -0.02 -0.21*** -0.15 
-9 -0.08* -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 
-8 -0.02 0.00 -0.15*** -0.10 
-7 -0.07** -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 
-6 -0.08** -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 
-5 -0.13*** -0.03 -0.14** -0.09 
-4 -0.16*** -0.01 -0.28*** -0.16 
-3 0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.08 
-2 -0.08* 0.00 -0.18*** -0.12 
-1 -0.05 0.00 -0.24*** -0.17 
0 0.03 0.00 0.07* -0.03 
1 0.12*** 0.01 0.11** 0.00 
2 0.20*** 0.02 0.09* 0.00 
3 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.03 
4 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.02 
5 -0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.03 
6 0.05 0.00 -0.11** -0.09 
7 0.07*** 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 
8 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 
9 -0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.02 
10 0.10** 0.01 0.05 -0.06 
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Panel B: Unexpected Mean Transaction sizes in Shares at Announcement of Accounting 
  Small Mean Small Median Large Mean Large Median 
-10 -0.07* -0.02 -0.21*** -0.23 
-9 -0.08* -0.01 -0.06 -0.12 
-8 -0.02 0.00 -0.12*** -0.15 
-7 -0.07** -0.01 -0.05* -0.13 
-6 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 
-5 -0.13*** -0.03 -0.01 -0.11 
-4 -0.16*** -0.01 -0.15*** -0.15 
-3 0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.03 
-2 -0.08* 0.00 -0.07* -0.13 
-1 -0.05 0.00 -0.09** -0.16 
0 0.03 0.00 0.11*** -0.03 
1 0.12*** 0.01 0.19*** 0.05 
2 0.20*** 0.02 0.10** -0.06 
3 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.09 
4 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.10 
5 -0.05 0.00 0.06 -0.07 
6 0.05 0.00 -0.10*** -0.13 
7 0.07* 0.00 0.00 -0.11 
8 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.10 
9 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.12 
10 0.10** 0.01 0.02 -0.12 
Notes: The ***, **, * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Figure 3 graphs unexpected mean transaction size around accounting 
restatement date. The graph indicates that small investors trade more around 
restatement announcements especially around days 2, 6, 7, and 10. The 
motivation for these trades may be a delayed response to the restatement 
announcement. Figure 4 graphs unexpected mean transaction shares around the 
restatement announcement date. The shape of the curve resembles Figure 3 
which shows small traders’ trading shares unexpectedly at days 2, 4, 6, 7, and 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Unexpected Mean Transaction Size Around Announcement of Restatement 
S. Demirkan & H. Platt / JEFA Vol:2 No:2 (2018) 29-59 
 
Page | 55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Unexpected Mean Transaction Shares at Announcement of Accounting 
Restatement 
Table 8 documents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for different time 
intervals in order to determine the market’s reaction to announcements. We 
found -8.7% announcement return is found which is consistent with Hribar and 
Jenkins (2004). Findings are presented graphically in Figure 5 for CAR (-2,2). 
Negative significant results are found for all CAR intervals but the absolute value 
of these returns is decreasing in the longer windows. This suggests that over time 
investors reappraise their valuation of companies that restate their earnings. 
Investors may believe that a further restatement is a low probability event.. Firms 
that have not yet restated their earnings have a risk, in these investor’s minds, of 
restating. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Cumulative Abnormal Return in Different Intervals 
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Table 8. Cumulative Abnormal Return 
CAR Mean Median 
(-250 to -3) -0.270*** -0.230 
(-60 to -3) -0.088*** -0.076 
(-50 to -3) -0.084*** -0.084 
(-40 to -3) -0.079*** -0.074 
(-2 to 2) -0.087*** -0.046 
(-30 to 30) -0.144*** -0.160 
(-1 to 0) -0.037*** -0.045 
(-1 to 1) -0.078*** -0.038 
(0 to 1) -0.077*** -0.036 
(0 to 30) -0.100*** -0.079 
(0 to 60) -0.097*** -0.118 
(3 to 30) -0.250*** -0.040 
(3 to 250) -0.051*** 0.194 
Notes: The ***, **, * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Ri,t=αi+βiRm,t+εi,t where t= -250,………..,-11 where αi, is a constant term for the ith stock is, 
βi is the market beta of the i
th stock, Rm,t is the market return, and εi,t is an error term. The 
parameters of the model are estimated by using the time series data from the estimation 
period that precedes each individual restatement announcement. The estimated 
parameters are then matched with the actual returns in the restatement announcement 
period. Then the Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as follows for different time 
period around the restatement announcement period. CARi,t=Ri,t-exp(αi)+exp(βi)Rm,t where 
t interval changes according to desired CAR calculation. 
5. Conclusion 
This study provides evidence on the role of investor size (large vs. small) as it 
influences trading response to accounting restatements before and after the 
announcement date. Large and small investors appear to respond to accounting 
restatement announcements differently which may result from their disparate 
stock of information and mechanisms for using information. Large investors have 
access to alternative pre-disclosure information sources which may allow them to 
forecast accounting restatements and decrease their equity holdings before the 
announcement date. This may explain the observed increased trading activity of 
large traders both before and after accounting restatements. 
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In addition, small and large traders have differential responses to a) who has 
prompted the restatement and b) to the reason for the restatement. Small 
investors appear to treat the initiator of the restatement as a significant piece of 
information and they appear to trade based on who has prompted the 
restatement. Small investors give less importance to the reasons for the 
restatement, possibly because they do not know how to use this information. On 
the other hand, large investors take into consideration both initiators and reasons 
for restatements while forming trading strategies. This result may relate to the 
sophistication of large traders, but it may also result from Kim and Verrecchia’s 
(1991) observation that different classes of investors interpret the same public 
announcement differently. 
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